Summary of Important Utah Criminal Cases

Published during the Vernal Equinox by Rich King.

Police Search & Seizure

In State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115 (April 3, 2008) the Utah Court of Appeals considered the search of a vehicle by a K-9 (drug dog) unit. A police officer stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation and arrested the driver because her license was suspended for drugs. The defendant was one of the passengers. The police officer ordered a K-9 unit to check the vehicle. The passengers were not free to leave until the K-9 unit arrived. The officer confiscated twelve knives from the passengers, but none of the passengers did anything to make him fear for his safety. When the K-9 unit arrived, the drug dog indicated that it smelled drugs in the vehicle. The officer then frisked the passengers and discovered paraphernalia on the defendant. While the defendant was being booked, police officers found a baggie of methamphetamine on the defendant. The trial court denied a motion filed by the defendant to suppress evidence and defendant appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court, holding that police officers may temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but the detention must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. The Court decided that it was unlawful to detain the passengers until the K-9 unit arrived because the driver was arrested well before the K-9 unit arrived and nothing in the officers’ testimony indicated any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on the part of the passengers. Further, the frisk was unlawful because the mere presence of knives, which had been confiscated, did not create a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and presently dangerous. The Court found that the “totality of the circumstances” showed that the officers had no heightened fear for their safety and only conducted the frisk to search for drugs. One of the Court of Appeals Judges wrote a concurring opinion, noting that the frisk for weapons was illegal due to the unreasonable detention.

In State v. Rowley, 2009 UT App 33 (February 12, 2009), the defendant asked his parents to take care of things in the bed of his truck. Because he thought it might rain, his father moved the truck into the garage. While in the cab of the truck, the defendant’s father saw drug paraphernalia. The defendant’s father and mother then searched the truck, and found more drug paraphernalia, returned the items to where they found them, and called the police. A police officer arrived and retrieved the drug paraphernalia. The defendant was charged with possession. When the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, he pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal. The Utah Court of Appeals held that the officer’s search did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court held that Fourth Amendment protections are inapplicable to searches conducted by private individuals not acting as government agents. “[A] private party’s replacement of the items back into a vehicle” does not change this result. The defendant lost his expectation of privacy in the contents of his truck “when his parents searched his truck and seized the evidence. The replacement of the evidence back into the truck by the Defendant’s father “in no way resuscitated [defendant’s] expectation of privacy.”

In State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388 (October 30, 2008), the defendant’s car collided with a motorcyclist and the motorcyclist died. At the crime scene, the defendant did not look intoxicated, but a police officer sought her consent to draw a sample of her blood “as a matter of course.” The defendant refused to consent because she feared needles. Based on her refusals and her family’s objections, the officer took the defendant into custody and put her in a police vehicle. In the vehicle, she was surrounded by State employees. She was terrified and crying. A blood draw technician eventually persuaded her to extend her arm to see if there was an “easy spot to draw blood.” When he found a spot, he said “we can go ahead and [take] care of this” and drew the defendant’s blood without obtaining “an express indication of her consent.” The blood draw showed a metabolite of cocaine and a blood alcohol level above the legal limit. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the blood draw evidence, and the defendant was convicted and appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s conviction, and concluded that the totality of the circumstances did not show that defendant voluntarily consented when she extended her arm. The Court also noted that no exigent circumstances existed because the police officers did not have probable cause to believe incriminating evidence would be found, and that there was no “persuasive evidence” that officers eventually would have secured a warrant to draw blood from the defendant.

In State v. Vasquez-Marquez, 2009 UT App 14 (January 23, 2009) a police officer obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s home. The affidavit used to obtain the warrant said that a confidential informant (CI) “conducted five controlled buys from [defendant]”; defendant met CI “within minutes of each call to request drugs”; “on three occasions,” defendant and an accomplice arrived in a vehicle registered to defendant’s home address; defendant “drove to his home after two of the five controlled buys”; and defendant “had an extensive criminal history, which included convictions for illegal possession or use of controlled substances.” The defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, but the trial court denied the motion and the defendant appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. Citing United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 1998), the Court held that probable cause to search a person’s home “‘does not arise based solely upon probable cause that the person is guilty of a crime.’” There must also be “‘evidence linking the person’s home to the suspected criminal activity.’” When determining whether probable cause exists, “the magistrate may draw ‘reasonable inferences,’” but the inferences “must be based on specific facts and cannot be the result of broad generalizations.” Thus, “an affidavit that details only the facts showing that the accused had been involved in selling drugs will never allow a reasonable inference that those drugs are stored at the accused’ residence.” The affidavit relied “on a generalization about where drug dealers keep their drugs and such a generalization . . . is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.”

In State v. Wilkinson, 2008 UT App 395 (October 30, 2008), the Defendant was a passenger in a car stopped for speeding. The driver admitted to the police officer that her license was suspended. The officer returned to his vehicle to verify the suspended license and to request a K-9 unit. Approximately two minutes later, the canine unit arrived. The drug dog alerted on the defendant. Sometime during the stop, the defendant provided a false name to the police. When the canine alerted, the officer recognized defendant and recalled that he had a warrant. The subsequent search revealed methamphetamine. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the request for a canine unit was an impermissible extension of the detention, but the trial court denied the motion and the defendant was convicted and appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), the Court concluded that requesting the K-9 unit did not impermissibly extend the scope of the detention because “the use of a dog to reveal drugs during the course of an otherwise lawful traffic stop does not implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy.” The Court decided that the request for a K-9 unit did not impermissibly extend the duration of the detention. Refusing to “evaluate each traffic stop with a second-by-second accounting of an officer’s actions,” the Court decided to “instead evaluate the reasonableness of the overall duration” of the detention. The stop lasted six to ten minutes. Because the stop evolved into an investigation of the driver’s driving on a suspended license, and because the occupants were not “detained for the sole purpose of subjecting them to a dog sniff after the traffic stop was or should have been legitimately concluded,” the Court concluded that the duration of the stop was not unreasonable.

In State v. Yount, 2008 UT App 102 (March 27, 2008), the defendant was in an automobile accident and was taken to the hospital. As part of his medical treatment, the hospital drew blood from the defendant. The prosecution subpoenaed defendant’s medical records without notifying him. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence regarding the blood draw, and the trial court found that the search and seizure of the defendant’s medical records was unreasonable, but declined to suppress the evidence because, finding that it was inevitable that the State would discovery the evidence because the State would have been able to obtain the defendant’s medical records if it had provided adequate notice to the defendant. The Utah Court of Appeals held that the State’s failure to notify defendant of the subpoenas was a violation of his rights that rendered the subpoenas invalid. The Court found that the medical records may have been protected by the physician-patient privilege and defendant had the right to be notified of potential disclosure of his confidential records. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution because the “inevitable discovery doctrine” did not apply. The Court found that the fact that proper action could have been taken does not, standing alone, justify the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Admitting such evidence at a trial would provide no deterrent to future unlawful state action. Therefore, because the trial court did not find that the State would have discovered the evidence through some other legal means, it erred in denying the motion to suppress.

In State of Utah v. Herrera, 2009 UT App 80 (March 19, 2009). In many rape cases there is no dispute that the defendant and the alleged victim had sexual intercourse. The defense of a rape case then focuses on whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual intercourse. In State v. Herrera, the defendant argued that the State did not produce sufficient evidence at trial to prove that sexual intercourse between the defendant and the victim was not consensual. The defendant argued that the victim’s testimony that she did not consent, without additional evidence, was not sufficient to prove rape beyond a reasonable doubt. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, stating that “we do not agree that” the victim's desire to maintain a friendly relationship with the defendant, in spite of the defendant's repetitive unwanted sexual advances, made her testimony that she did not consent to sexual intercourse with the defendant physically impossible or apparently false.” The Court further stated that “[l]ack of consent is established when "the victim expresses lack of consent through words or conduct" or "the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force or violence." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406(1), (2) (2008).” Victim testified that she rejected Defendant's sexual advances "millions of times" by saying "No" and by trying "to get away from [him]." She further testified that, despite her attempts to prevent Defendant from being physically able to have intercourse with her, Defendant pushed and pulled her into a position in which he could, and ultimately did, complete the sexual act.” In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court was presented with testimony from the victim’s reviewing physician detailing the physical trauma resulting from Defendant's assault. In light of this testimony the Court stated that “we conclude that reasonable minds could have reached the same result that the jury did in this case.”